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COMMENT
that the "man of the future" has turned out to be the lawyer still,
and that this is the way it ought to be. Economics and statistics,
along with other sciences, have become more useful to the law than
they were; they are oftener used, and with more telling effect, but
they remain the domain of the specialist, and the law, in its bulk, is
still made by counsellors, advocates, and judges. The sciences may
guide the situation-sense, and help the searcher find it for his case,
but it is still legal technique and legal technicians that control the
growth of the law. One of the author's most telling passages, I think,
is his strong defense of the unspecialized supreme court, which, in the
end, reduces all the experts to guides, and arrives at its own conclu-
sions about ends and means.188 The negative merits of the non-expert
court of last resort appear in its refusals to turn over its functions
automatically to green and untried scientific instruments. The book
under review is the best example of its positive merits.
But these are only a few of the paths which open out from this
book. The end of it all is, that it will stand reading, frequent re-
reading, and a lifetime of browsing, and repay all the study with
interest.
Comment-Harvey M. Johnsen*
My interest in Llewellyn's book is naturally from the judicial side.
He has done a notable job, I think, in his reminders, urgings and
challenges to the appellate bench as to the approaches and processes of
its opinion work.
In the book's concreteness and comprehensiveness, along with its
currency, it will have a value and an impact over the previous general
materials in the field. Also, Llewellyn's passion and provocativeness
give it something of a searing flame, as against the embering glow
of the writings, both lofty and unlofty, which have gone before.
His gathering and labeling of the many tools of the judicial work-
shop is a service that of itself is most worthwhile. These are things
which judges for the most part know that their tool chests contain,
but of which they do not often enough, perhaps, make a conscious
inventory in the routine performance of their work. Certainly, room
exists for some of these tools to be made to have a more objective
"feel," and so a smoother use, in many judges' hands.
I should hope that every judge of an appellate court will take the
time to read the book leisurely, and that the members of the court will
188. Quoted in text accompanying note 146, supra.
* Chief Judge, 8th Circuit, United States Court of Appeals.
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then see fit to get together and discuss it. Out of this, there will not
come, nor should there, any "hook-line-and-sinker" acceptance and
results. But the book can and is worthy to be made the occasion for
the judges of a court to take a look at and discuss among themselves
the general craftsmanship of their work-something a court does not
often collectively have or take the time to do.
Whether Llewellyn is right in characterizing present appellate
court work as a "stubborn but still purblind groping toward full
recapture of our [earlier] classic Grand Style"' does not too much
concern me. History and tradition are, of course, always strong and
easy means for making appeal in any area of the law and its institu-
tions. And if calling for a recapture of historic "Grand Style" or a
return to the manner of "our classic period" can effectively exhort
to improvement in judicial opinion, I am all for the device.
I should think it, however, a somewhat oversimplified premise for
the accomplishment of that result to assert that what happened and
what is at fault is that:
the appellate judges [all over the country] sought to do their
deciding without reference to much except the rules, sought to
eliminate the impact of sense, as an intrusion, and sought to
write their opinions as if wisdom (in contrast to logic) were
hardly a decent attribute of a responsible appellate court.2
On this basis, of course, the pathway is obvious and simple-re-
pentance, renunciation and shaking the evangelist's hand.
If, as a class, however, judicial opinions of this era are charac-
teristically of the pattern Llewellyn sees in them, this can hardly be
explained on the easy basis that it is because the judges of the various
appellate tribunals have somehow all joined or reacted together and
perversely sought to bring about that result.
Whenever a pattern in the functioning of democratic institutions
comes to exist, which is deep and widespread enough to give rise to an
era, it is generally necessary to look for more behind it than an
artificiality. It will ordinarily be found to be a product resulting from
the play of a variety of elements and forces.
This is not the place, however, in merely making comments on
Llewellyn's book, to digress into a discussion of the factors which have
prompted and underlie present-day opinion work and style. Nor
would I desire to engage in an apologia of that work and style-
although I do not entirely see it in the same light as Llewellyn. All I
take occasion to point out is that there are elements involved to which
Llewellyn's premise does not reach, and in relation to which that
premise does not afford the basis for any full result.
1. LLMwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 59 (1960).
2. Id. at 5-6. (Author's emphasis.)
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Of course, judicial opinions can be better. Judges are the first to so
admit. I don't believe that any judge has at any time written an
opinion with which he has ever been wholly satisfied. This goes to
craftsmanship as well as substantiveness.
Within Llewellyn's principal criticism, as it impresses me, the
appellate courts are claimed to have held themselves in too much
restraint-too much restraint in not translating each case into a type
situation or a class sense; in not clearly expressing that sense and
channeling it into doctrine; in not keeping the doctrinal path un-
clouded by reconciling or overruling any previous cases of possible
impingement; and similarly in not allowing statutes to have the fullest
remedial play of which they are capable.
I suppose that the academic field of the profession will always
have some impatience at judicial restraint. Here, I merely note that,
through the last quarter century, the courts have continuously had to
feel their way through vast new social and economic areas of both
statutory and decisional law. On common law basis, most of the
courts, both state and federal, have chosen to move forward primarily
in a step by step progression (often even in statutory application),
until they could be certain that the full horizon and its implications
had been seen. A court that has done otherwise is apt to have yielded
to the personal philosophy of its members, whether this be in one or
the other direction. It may be that this general judicial attitude of
caution through this period has had its effect also in some restraints
upon the court's other work, where this was unnecessary.
But regardless of any of this, the fact nonetheless remains, as I
have stated, that judicial opinions can be improved, and that they
are subject to betterment in most of the respects which Llewellyn
points out. This, however, will not be on the basis of a revolution, for
opinions will not universally, nor even individual opinions fully, ever
embody all of these academic standards. A judge will write an opinion
in which some of the standards will be present and others lacking.
In another of his opinions, some of those which were lacking will
appear, and some of those which were present will be absent. And
these differences will not be capable of being explained by asserting
that they rest solely on an arbitrary basis. There are reasons beyond
this, which, of course, the opinion does not explain. Even in Cardozo,
Llewellyn must profess to some disappointment, because there are
times when he cannot find his complete symphony.
I am glad that Llewellyn has written his book, and at this particular
time. As I have suggested, it is something that every appellate judge
should read. It is a work that it is worthwhile for the members of an
appellate court to discuss together. Out of this, as I have suggested,
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will not come any revolution, but there can come a helpful contribution
to improvement in judicial opinions, both individual and general.
Were I to add a few formal words, I should say that the book is too
long. It makes too many repeated servings of the same food. Also, it
makes the mistake of trying to serve its readers as separate classes.
The value of the book is in the general meat course which it provides,
for over-all professional consumption, and not in the side appetites
which it seeks to create by adding small doses of special-group sea-
soning. I think it weakens the force of the book to try to pass out
something different or special in every possible direction-to judges,
to practicing lawyers, to house counsel, to "law school skeptic" (and
even to Dietrich ["They are wonderful legs"]).
For example, as to practicing lawyers, reckonability is hardly likely,
in our American legal system, to become such a professional cult or
pursuit as to have any noticeable effect on the dockets of our appellate
courts. And as a concluding illustration, one cannot help wondering
to what purpose and for what special audience the author has chosen
to engage in a personal attack on members of the Supreme Court.
Within the book's general channel, however, to which it ought to
have been limited, Llewellyn is entitled to credit for a thorough,
thoughtful and provocative job, from which some measure of good in
judicial opinion writing should come.
Comment-Laurance M. Hyde*
This book should be helpful to lawyers, particularly to lawyers who
practice in appellate courts, as well as to appellate judges. Lawyers
will better understand how appellate courts operate. Judges will
better understand their functions and controlling factors in making
decisions.
Professor Llewellyn finds a loss of confidence in appellate courts by
the bar and the public which he demonstrates is unjustified and is due
to misunderstanding of the judicial process. He finds that too many
people have the impression that appellate courts decide cases un-
predictably, according to their own feelings and desires, and not in
accordance with definite legal principles. He shows that while cer-
tainty of results is impossible, because of the difference in factual
situations, reckonability of results in appellate courts is high. He
states this reckonability is partly due to many major steadying fac-
tors. Some of these are: judges law conditioned by training, legal doc-
trine guiding decisions, known doctrinal techniques, responsibility for
* Chief Justice, Missouri Supreme Court.
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